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DOG SNIFF SEARCHES AND UNITED STATES V.
THOMAS: THE SECOND CIRCUIT TAKES A
NEEDED BITE OUT OF PLACE
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States continues to wage war against drug trafficking.'
Today, drugs arrive in this country by boat,2 by plane3 and by person.
They are concealed in the false botioms of aerosol cans and in the heels
of shoes and are dissolved in liquor.4 Smugglers use state-of-the-art
equipment to mask their activities.5 Herculean efforts to reduce drug
production in this and other countries and to prevent importation into
this country6 have failed to eliminate the problem.7 Notwithstanding
1. President Reagan formed a Task Force Program to "destroy the operations of organi-
zations engaged in drug trafficking in this country." Organzed Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force: Goals and Objectives, 11 DRUG ENFORCEMENT, Summer 1984, at 3, 3. The Task Force
Program is comprised of individuals from the United States Attorney's Office, the Drug En-
forcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Customs
Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Internal Revenue Service, the
United States Coast Guard and the United States Marshal's Office. Id.
In yet another attempt to curb drug trafficking, a high-level Western Hemisphere confer-
ence was announced in January, 1986. Williams, U.S., Mexico Will Call Anti-Drug Confer-
ence, L.A. Times, Jan. 4, 1986, pt. I, at 1, col. 2.
2. Florida has a 1300 mile coastline. Approximately 5000 boats each year attempt to
bring drugs into the United States along this border. Miami alone has 800,000 registered
pleasure craft. A Losing Battle, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 25, 1985, at 52, 55.
3. In February, 1985, for example, approximately 2500 pounds of cocaine were found on
a Colombian 747 aircraft. Id. at 55. Although the United States Customs Service is responsi-
ble for air border interdictions, it is too ill-equipped to be successful. May, Customs Cuts
Would Hurt'Drug Fight, Official Says, L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1986, pt. I, at 16, col. 1. See infra
note 7 and accompanying text.
4. A Losing Battle, supra note 2, at 55. United States Customs agents watch the way
people walk. "'If they walk funny, [an agent] tears their shoes apart ... '" Id. (quoting
Regional Customs Comm'r Robert Battard).
5. Electronic detection devices, radio receivers, communication devices and high per-
formance aircraft are used by smugglers. Frontiers of Science, 10 DRUG ENFORCEMENT, Fall
1983, at 43, 45.
6. The United States spent $1.2 billion in 1985 in an attempt to combat the drug trade. A
Losing Battle, supra note 2, at 52. In 1985, a three month "massive" air, sea and land cam-
paign was launched in order to shut off the flow of Colombian and Caribbean drugs. Ger-
stenzang & Ostrow, U.S. Launches Massive Caribbean Drug Drive, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1985,
pt. I, at I, col. 3. The operation, Hat Trick II, targets all methods of drug smuggling and is
intended to "'stop all drug flow."' Id. at 24, col. 1 (quoting "a Pentagon source").
7. Most smugglers simply are not caught. A Losing Battle, supra note 2, at 55. Interdic-
tion has only successfully eliminated approximately one-tenth of United States bound illicit
drugs. Gerstenzang & Ostrow, supra note 6, at 24, col. 1. The overwhelming odds against the
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some remarkable successes in these efforts,' production9 and importa-
tion"0 are on the increase. The result is that "[s]tamping out illicit drugs
is like trying to control a glob of mercury: Press it, and it squirts off in
all directions."11
In an attempt to counteract the ingenuity and sheer number of
smugglers, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents increas-
ingly turn to modern technology to assist them in drug detection.12 Sci-
entific advances provide devices which become "everyday tools" of drug
enforcement officers in the field.3
United States include "[e]conomic realities, corruption, threats, politics and nature itself." A
Losing Battle, supra note 2, at 52.
To exacerbate the situation, congressional critics claim that the Reagan Administration's
proposed drug enforcement budget cuts for 1987 will end the war on drugs, with smugglers
emerging victorious. May, supra note 3, at 16, col. 1.
8. A Colombian eradication program destroyed 4000 hectares of marijuana in 1984.
Thomas, FY1986 Assistance Requests for Narcotics Control, 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2099, at
62 (June 1985). South Florida agents captured 4.5 million pounds of marijuana and 44,000
pounds of cocaine in 1984. A Losing Battle, supra note 2, at 55. The Coast Guard captures
two million pounds of marijuana a year. Id.
9. Although decreases in production are reported, the Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics Matters stated that "there were some disappointments" regarding the
increase in production in some countries. Thomas, supra note 8, at 62. In 1984, of the 13
major drug-producing countries, seven increased their production of coca (cocaine), marijuana
and opium poppy crops (heroin). A Losing Battle, supra note 2, at 52.
10. In 1985, heroin and marijuana imports were expected to increase 10% and cocaine
47% over the same figures for 1984. Id. The enormous profit potential, the variety of trans-
portation routes and the relatively small amounts of drugs necessary to meet demand-40 tons
of cocaine will supply the United States for a year--combine to keep production flowing. Ger-
stenzang & Ostrow, supra note 6, at 24, col. 1.
11. .4 Losing Battle, supra note 2, at 56. Production springs up elsewhere in response to
destruction of crops and laboratories. Id. In 1982, after heroin laboratories in Sicily were
destroyed by the Italian government, Pakistan and Afghanistan took up the slack. Id.
12. For example, "Fat Albert" is one of three 200,000 cubic feet helium balloons currently
in use in Florida to detect drug smugglers. Eye in the Sky, TIME, May 13, 1985, at 27, 27. The
balloons are 175 feet long and are equipped with $3.5 million in sophisticated radar equipment.
The airborne radar allows the balloon to pick up traffic in "Smuggler's Alley," a band of the
Caribbean sky not detectable to land-based radar. When a balloon sights a suspicious flight, a
Customs plane is sent out after it. The Administration has agreed to allocate an additional
nine million dollars for three more balloons. Id.
Another device relied on by enforcement officers is a DEA satellite communication sys-
tem (SATCOM). Frontiers of Science, supra note 5, at 45. SATCOM is a portable, deployable
unit, packaged in two suitcases, which provides digital communication capability for investiga-
tive personnel. The transmitter, receiver, terminal and antenna can be set up in 10 minutes in
order to transmit messages through a satellite repeater. Id.
13. Frontiers of Science, supra note 5, at 43. "Major cases are no longer brought to [trial
unless there is] significant technological evidence in the form of eavesdropping recordings,
videotape recordings of criminal activities, radio-beacon assisted physical surveillance, low-
light image-enhancement.., and all of the peripheral equipment needed to operate or exploit
those areas of advanced technology." Id. at 45.
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Sophisticated practices to detect drugs currently include the use of
dogs.14 Although governments and law enforcement agencies have uti-
lized the dog's sense of smell for centuries, i" the use of dogs to sniff for
drugs is relatively recent.16 Today dogs are vital to drug control
programs.
17
Despite their important contributions, innovative law enforcement
techniques also raise serious fourth amendment questions." Use of de-
vices, such as dogs, to locate drugs may infringe on an individual's right
to be protected against unreasonable searches.19 At first blush, the ab-
stract concept of a dog sniffing luggage at an airport might not seem
14. A dog's remarkable capability for detecting concealed items is well illustrated by the
truffle hunting dog. C. HUBBARD, DOGS IN BRITAIN (1948). Truffles, an expensive delicacy,
are actually fungi which flourish in winter about three inches below the surface of the ground.
Truffle hunting dogs are capable of sniffing out this treat and have been used in England for
hundreds of years. Id. at 336-38.
15. See generally C. HUBBARD, supra note 14. For hundreds of years, the dog has been
used in a variety of ways. Bloodhounds were used in the 16th and 17th centuries at Scottish
borders to track down sheep thieves and poachers. Id. at 352. Dogs were then allowed free
access to any house where the trail of a felon led. Id. Dogs were also used during World War
I to haul ammunition and supplies, carry messages and lead ambulances to wounded soldiers.
Id. at 453. By the end of the hostilities, there were approximately 100,000 war dogs on all
fronts. Id. In the 20th century, dogs have been. used as part of K-9 units in order to aid police.
Blue, a Los Angeles-based german sherpherd, conducted 734 searches and captured 253 felony
suspects. Freed, Blue Penciled, L.A. Times, Oct. 4, 1985, pt. II, at 1, col. 2. Nick Carter, a
bloodhound, was responsible for trailing and capturing 600 criminals. C. HUBBARD, supra
note 14, at 352. He held the record time for following a 104-hour old trail. Id.
16. Dogs were introduced to contraband-detection in 1970 in response to increasing drug
traffic. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, DEP'T OF TREASURY, TRAINING MANUAL 2-3 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as TRAINING MANUAL]. Only one of 43 healthy and temperamentally sound
dogs is selected for narcotics detection training. Id. at 34. The dog must demonstrate a bold
attitude and "a very strong, almost frantic, desire to retrieve a thrown object." Id. at 35.
17. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at Intro. "The dog's part in aiding law enforce-
ment officers in protecting society from the awesome drug problem is a most significant contri-
bution that must never be overlooked." Id. Dogs are responsible for seizures of drugs worth
hundreds of millions of dollars. Id. At airports, dogs are primarily used in baggage areas to
examine containers on moving conveyor belts. Id. at 40. During training, dogs are placed on
non-moving conveyor belts and encouraged to walk back and forth, while playing with a re-
trieving dummy. Id. at 35-36. The handler will excitedly tease the dog with the dummy before
throwing it. When the dog retrieves it, the handler and the dog will play tug of war with the
dummy. A good narcotics detection dog will carefully retrieve the dummy and display a pos-
sessive attitude towards it. Id. at 35.
18. ~he fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. See, eg., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic listening device placed
outside telephone booth to monitor conversation inside booth is a search). For further discus-
sion of Katz, see infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 2761 (1983) (use of "beeper" emitting radio signal to establish location of car on public
roads does not violate driver's reasonable expectation of privacy).
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offensive. However, the inevitable extension of this investigative method
seriously threatens individual privacy." The potential for erosion of pri-
vacy protections has increased due to the magnitude of the drug problem,
the commitment of law enforcement to eradicating drugs and the public
perception of drugs as evil. Technological advances which could not pos-
sibly have been envisioned by the framers of the Constitution must be
accommodated to achieve social goals. Yet this accommodation must
not trammel one of the most cherished rights of this country, the right to
freedom from unwarranted government intrusions.
In March, 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ac-
knowledged this danger by holding that a dog sniff outside an individual's
apartment was a search.2 Thus, despite strong public pressure favoring
drug control, United States v. Thomas22 imposed a fourth amendment
limitation on law enforcement use of dogs to detect drugs. Only three
years earlier, however, in United States v. Place,23 the Supreme Court
held that the use of dogs to detect drugs in a public place was not a
search.24 Since Place, courts analyzing dog sniffs have been divided on
the question of whether individuals are-entitled-to any fourth amendment
protection.25
This Note examines the validity of the Thomas decision in light of
Place, and finds that the Second Circuit's holding-that sniffs do violate
privacy protections in certain circumstances-is consistent with the
holding in Place. The consistency arises from the distinct factual settings
involved. Place involved a dog sniff at an airport, while the sniff in
Thomas was of an individual's home. The differing governmental inter-
ests and expectations of individual privacy involved an analysis of the
"search" definition in a new context, allowing, if not requiring, a differ-
ent result. This Note concludes that Place should be limited to its facts,
and that in the future, dog sniff cases should be decided according to a
Thomas analysis with the possibility of a reduced standard of probable
cause in appropriate-situations.
20. See infra notesl02-34 and accompanying text.
21. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985).
22. Id.
23. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
24. Id. at 707.
25. See, eg., United States v. Vermouth, No. CR 83-731 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1984) (un-
published Findings of Fact) (sniff of private storage locker not a search), affid, No. 84-5111
(9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985) (unpublished opinion), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S.
Dec. 4, 1985) (No. 85-966); People v. Unruh, 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2349 (Colo. Jan. 21,
1986) (sniff of stolen container brought to police station for safe keeping is search requiring
reasonable suspicion). For a discussion of these two cases, see, respectively, infra notes 104-09
& 195-204 and accompanying text.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In United States v. Thomas,26 James Wheelings was one of eight de-
fendants convicted in the Southern District of New York of various drug,
firearms and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)27 violations. 28 The evidence presented at trial included twenty-
seven audio and video recordings, forty drug exhibits and hundreds of
business and drug records obtained from various searches conducted
over a nine-year period.29 One of the searches was of defendant Wheel-
ings' Bronx apartment.30 The warrant to search Wheelings' apartment
authorized a search for "'narcotics and financial records, quantities of
heroin traces, and other evidence.' "31 The Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA) agent's affidavit underlying the search warrant relied in
part on a positive alert by a drug detecting dog outside Wheelings' apart-
ment 32 to establish probable cause.33 The district court denied Wheel-
ings' motion to suppress evidence obtained in the search of his
apartment.
34
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Wheelings contended that the evi-
dence seized at his apartment should have been suppressed. He argued
that the sniff itself was an illegal search-and could not be used to support
the probable cause determination, and that absent the sniff, the affidavit
26. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985).
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West Supp. 1985).
28. 757 F.2d at 1361. According to the evidence presented at trial, the defendants were
involved in a huge narcotics ring run by the "Council." In addition to purchasing and selling
large quantities of heroin, PCP, cocaine and marijuana, the Council allocated sales territories,
adjudicated disputes among members and "routinely approved the murders of those suspected
of being potential witnesses against the Council or of people who had been insubordinate." Id.
at 1362. Five defendants were members of the "Council." The remaining three defendants,
including defendant Wheelings, "were connected to the Council's business." Id.
29. Id. at 1365. In addition to the physical evidence, more than 121 witnesses testified for
the government. Id.
30. Id. In Wheelings' apartment, DEA agents found documents "pertaining to auto regis-
tration, insurance, taxes and the like." Id. at 1366. A bulletproof vest also was found. Id.
31. Id. at 1365-66 (quoting search warrant at issue).
32. The court did not indicate the dog's exact location when he alerted outside Wheelings'
apartment.
33. Id. at 1366. The affidavit also stated that Wheelings, upon notification of his arrest the
previous day, quickly closed his apartment door so no one could enter, and that a reliable
informant observed Wheelings processing and repackaging heroin in mills partially controlled
by Wheelings between September and October, 1976, between June and December, 1980, and
in 1981. In addition, Wheelings' apartment repeatedly was occupied by "high-ranking mem-
ber[s] of a massive narcotics organization." Based on all of this evidence, the DEA agent
stated that there was probable cause to believe that there would be evidence of drug trafficking
in the apartment. Id. at 1366-67.
34. Id. at 1366.
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was-insufficient to establish probable cause.35 The Second Circuit agreed
that the sniff was an illegal search.36 However, it upheld the district court
because the law enforcement officers acted in good faith reliance on the
search warrant.
37 -
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
The majority in United States v. Thomas3" held that the canine sniff
outside Wheelings' apartment constituted an illegal search.39 Relying on
the fourth amendment prohibition against "'unreasonable government
intrusions,' ""4 the Second Circuit decided that sniffs by trained dogs
outside private dwellings intrude "on a legitimate expectation of
privacy."
41
The Thomas court noted that courts consistently recognize that in-
dividuals possess a "heightened privacy interest" in their homes.42 Ac-
cordingly, Wheelings had a legitimate expectation that the contents of his
apartment would remain private.43 Using a dog to detect contraband
outside his door "impermissibly intruded on that legitimate
expectation.""
35. Id. See supra note 33.
36. 757 F.2d at 1368.
37. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419 (1984)).
38. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985).
39. Id. at 1367. Judges Newman and Davis concurred with the majority on this issue. Id.
at 1372 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Judge Newman dissented on
the issue of imposing cumulative sentences); id. at 1376 (Davis, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge
Davis' dissenting and concurring opinion.
40. Id. at 1366 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977)).
41. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). In Katz, the defendant Katz
was convicted of violating a federal statute which prohibited the transmission of betting infor-
mation across state lines by telephone. 389 U.S. at 348. The Court held that attaching an
electronic "bug" to the outside of a public telephone booth in order to hear and record Katz's
conversation was a search. Id. at 353. What a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52. For further
discussion of the Katz standard, see infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
42. 757 F.2d at 1366 (citing United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1980)
(use of telescope to identify objects or activities which could not be identified without it was a
search)); United States v. Bonfiglio, 713 F.2d 932, 937 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[I]t was not the en-
hancement of the sensesperse that was held unlawful in Taborda, but the warrantless invasion
of the right to privacy in the home."); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983)
(beeper used to track defendant's activities outside-but not inside-home not a search be-
cause "traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling place" not disturbed).
43. 757 F.2d at 1367.
44. Id. at 1366. "'iTihe very fact that a person is in his own home raises a reasonable
inference that he intends to have privacy, and if that inference is borne out by his actions,
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The Second Circuit distinguished the holding in United States v..
Place4 5-that dog sniffs in public places are not searches-by contrasting
the diminished expectation of privacy an individual maintains in the con-
tents of luggage in the custody of an air carrier.46 The court stated that
"[ilt is one thing to say that a sniff in an airport is not a search, but quite
another to say that a sniff can never be a search." 47 A sniff of a home,
according to the court, mandates a different result than an airport sniff.1
8
Although a dog sniff may be a discriminating and inoffensive technique
in an airport, a practice which is "not intrusive in a public airport-may be
intrusive when employed at a person's home." 9
Further, the court reasoned that the use of a dog is.not a mere im-
provement of the human sense of smell, but a "significant enhancement
accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory instrument. ' 50 The
police, by using a trained dog, may discover information they could not
possibly obtain by use of their own senses.51 Wheelings, then, had an
additional legitimate expectation that the contents *of his apartment
would not be sensed by such a superior instrument.52
The Second Circuit construed Place narrowly, as holding "only 'that
the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue
here-exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public
place, to a-trained-canine-did not .constitute a "search." ' ,,5
B. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Davis disagreed with the "strong implication
(if not outright statement) that a canine sniff outside a dwelling can never
be considered by a magistrate in support of a proposed search war-
rant."54 According to the dissent, there are other circumstances in
society is prepared to respect his privacy.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d
131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980)).
45. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
46. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366.
47. Id. (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. Id. Notwithstanding the discriminating nature of the sniff, it nonetheless "remains a
way of detecting the contents of a private, enclosed space." Id. at 1367.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. For further discussion of a dog as a superior, sensory instrument, see supra notes
14-18 and infra note 165.
53. 757 F.2d at 1367 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
54. Id. at 1376 (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, the dissent agreed that under the facts of this case the magistrate should not have
considered the sniff since the other evidence in support of probable cause was too weak. Id.
(Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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which a sniff should be considered-by the magistrate along with other
evidence of probable cause." Thereforee,-Judge Davis would have left the
question open in future cases. 6
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Searches: An Historical Background
The fourth amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches .... -sT Not all government intrusions constitute searches. 8
Yet, where a search occurs, the fourth amendment provides a safeguard
against indiscriminate probes. 9 Searches are illegal unless based on
probable cause.6 0 When properly applied, the fourth amendment limits
state intrusion into an individual's privacy.6
Unfortunately, "[tjhe course of true law pertaining to searches...
55. Id. (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, the dissent did not
cite any examples of such circumstances.
56. Id. (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra note 178 for discus-
sion of Judge Davis' analysis of probable cause.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment evolved from the colonists' negative
experiences with writs of assistance and general warrants which granted "sweeping power...
to search at large for smuggled goods." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977). No
evidence or suspicion was necessary for the issuance of a general search warrant. Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1928) (Reporter's summary of argument for the United
States). English courts condemned general warrants and the House of Commons declared the
practice illegal. Id. (Reporter's summary of argument for the United States). Writs of assist-
ance, however, were authorized in the colonies in 1767. Id. (Reporter's summary of argument
for the United States). "It is quite apparent that the principal, if not the sole peril in the minds
of those who advocated the [fourth] amendment and against which its protection was intended
was the use of general warrants and the writs of assistance." Id. at 450 (Reporter's summary
of argument for the United States).
58. Traditionally, a "'search implie[d] a prying into hidden places for that which is con-
cealed and that the object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way.'"
1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1, at
222 (1978) (quoting 79 C.J.S. Searches & Seizures § 1 (1952)). The Supreme Court, however,
has never comprehensively defined "search." Id. § 2.1, at 223.
59. For a discussion of fourth amendment searches, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 358 (1974). If the activity is not a search, the
"government enjoys a virtual carte blanche to do as it pleases." Horton v. Goose Creek Indep.
School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
60. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1969) (probable cause necessary for
search warrant). Probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical conception that need not be
based on direct, first-hand, or 'hard' evidence. Nonetheless, there must be enough evidence
reasonably to believe that evidence of illegal activity will be present at the specific time and
place of the search." United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir.) (citation omit-
ted), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985).
61. The fourth amendment, therefore, is a "profoundly anti-government document." Am-
sterdam, supra note 59, at 353.
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has not-to put it mildly-run smooth[ly]. '" 2 Since its inception, the
fourth amendment has undergone dramatic changes in interpretation.
63
From 1920 to 1967, government intrusions into individual privacy were
not considered to be searches unless there was an accompanying tres-
pass. 6M Individuals received no fourth amendment protection unless they
had proprietary or possessory interests in the property searched.65 In
Olmstead v. United States,66 the Supreme Court held that eavesdropping
on telephone conversations by tapping the wires was not a search because
the "wires are not part of [one's] house or office any more than are the
highways along which they are stretched.167 A search, then, required an
actual physical invasion into a "constitutionally protected area."68
In 1967, the Supreme Court repudiated the trespass doctrine- In
Katz v. United States,69 the Court held that it was a search to attach an
electronic eavesdropping device to the outside of a telephone booth in
order to hear and record conversation inside 'the booth.7 ° The fourth
amendment was intended to "protect people, not places." 71 The Katz
standard, set out in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, focused on pri-
vacy interests rather than property. As interpreted in Katz, the Constitu-
tion will protect individuals who have "exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and .. the expectation [is] one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "72 In order to determine whether
62. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(landlord's consent to search lessee's apartment does not vitiate warrant requirement).
63. The problem partially stems from the fact that "[f]or clarity and consistency, the law
of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court's most successful product." Amsterdam,
supra note 59, at 349.
64. C. 'WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES AND CONCEPTS § 13.02(a) (1980).
65. Compare Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942) (no trespass when dicta-
phone placed against office wall to hear conversations in office next door since no invasion of
office) with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (trespass doctrine excluded eaves-
dropping evidence when "spike" microphone inserted under baseboard made contact with
heating duct running throughout defendant's house since actual invasion into house).
66. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
67. Id. at 465. Olmstead imported and distributed contraband alcohol in violation of the
prohibition acts. Id. The police discovered his involvement by using telephonic eavesdropping
equipment. Id. at 456. The Court held that there was neither a search nor seizure because
"[tihe insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the defendants." Id. at 457.
68. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). Constitutionally protected areas
were: "persons," including bodies of persons and clothing; "houses," including business offices,
stores and garages; "papers," including letters; and "effects," including cars. 1 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 58, § 2.1, at 351.
69. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See supra note 41.
70. Id. at 353.
71. Id. at 351.
72. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although the Katz standard expanded the scope of
May 1986] 1105 ,
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society will tolerate a privacy interest, governmental interests are bal-
anced against individual expectations of privacy. 73 The government in-
terest rests in preventing crime, while the individual interest rests in
being left alone.74
The balancing equation may result in a reduction of an individual's
privacy expectations. For example, individuals generally have legitimate
privacy interests in their luggage and effects.75 The police may not rou-
tinely search luggage without a warrant based on probable cause.76
However, when police have probable cause to believe contraband is lo-
cated in an automobile, they may search luggage in the vehicle without a
warrant.7 7 In such a circumstance, the government interest in prompt,
effective discovery of contraband overrides the fourth amendment war-
the fourth amendment, the vague nature of the standard rendered it "impossible to state with
precision the degree of this expansion." 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 2.1, at 229. The
ultimate question of whether an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy is a
value judgment and is therefore not susceptible to an exact definition.
73. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), illustrates the proper focus of a
fourth amendment inquiry. The Court held that the fourth amendment does not allow a rov-
ing border patrol to stop a car near the Mexican border to question the occupants regarding
their immigration status when the only ground for suspicion was that the occupants looked
Mexican. The Court carefully weighed the valid public interest in preventing illegal entry of
aliens against interference with individual liberty. Id. at 883. While recognizing that the eco-
nomic and social problems created by aliens are a legitimate public concern, the Court held
that allowing the government to stop cars day or night on a city street or a busy highway
would result in broad and unlimited discretion inconsistent with fourth amendment goals. Id.
at 882-83.
74. The concern is that "if the particular form of surveillance practiced ... is permitted to
go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of priacy and freedom remaining to
citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open soci-
ety." Amsterdam, supra note 59, at 403.
75. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) ("Luggage contents are not open to
public view.... [L]uggage is intended as a repository of personal effects."); see also Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979) ("[A]s we observed in [Chadwick], luggage is a common
repository for one's personal effects, and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation
of privacy").
76. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the defendants were observed loading
an unusually heavy footlocker onto a train bound for Boston. The footlocker was leaking
talcum powder, a substance frequently used to mask the odor of marijuana or hashish. When
the train arrived in Boston, federal agents arrested the defendants and seized the footlocker.
More than an hour after the arrest, the agents opened and searched the footlocker without a
warrant. The Court held the search invalid and noted the important privacy interests at stake.
Id. at 15-16. When the defendants placed "personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker,
[they] manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examina-
tion." Id. at 11.
77. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (warrantless search of compartments
and all containers within vehicle whose contents are not in plain view upheld if police stopping
auto had probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband).
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rant requirement.78 Similarly, if the police have reason to believe that
lives are endangered or that evidence is in imminent danger of being de-
stroyed, a warrantless search may be held based on these exigent
circumstances.79
"Plain view" is another fourth amendment doctrine that justifies
warrantless government intrusions. Under the plain view doctrine, it is
not a search if a police officer, who has a right to be in a particular place,
observes something that is exposed to the general public.80 An individual
has no expectation of privacy in anything "that he knowingly exposes to
the public." 81 The government interest in discovering contraband and
preventing crime takes priority in such instances.82
78. Id. Congress has always considered warrantless searches of vessels, wagons and car-
riages reasonable. Id. at 805 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925)).
79. "The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an
investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others." Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (upholding warrantless entry into house to search for
armed robber).
Potential destruction of evidence may also justify otherwise illegal police activities. In
State v. Anaya, 89 N.M. 302, 303, 551 P.2d 992, 993 (1976):
Officers obtained a search warrant to search the trailer occupied by defendants. The
search party arrived a short distance from the trailer at 6:00 a.m. At 6:03 a.m.,
Lieutenant Montoya and Officer Lopez removed a piece from the skirting around the
base of the trailer, crawled underneath and began sawing the sewer pipe beyond the
confluence of the piping from the two bathrooms. Someone used one of the bath-
rooms. When the toilet was flushed the officers were sprayed with water and urine
from the opening in the partially sawed pipe. Fearing their presence under the trailer
had been discovered, by walkie-talkie, Lieutenant Montoya directed other officers to
execute the search warrant. This message was received at 6:09 a.m. Officers arrived
at the front door of the trailer at 6:10 a.m. The officers underneath the trailer heard
the officers knock and identify themselves at the front door of the trailer. The officers
underneath the trailer heard running followed by a second flush. They had just com-
pleted the severing of the pipe. They recovered two packets of heroin from the sewer
pipe immediately after the second flush.
The court held that the defendants' previous post-arrest conduct-running for the bathroom-
provided the "exigent circumstances" to justify severing the sewer line. Id. at 303, 551 P.2d at
993.
80. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam). Harris was arrested for
robbery as he entered a car. While securing the car, an officer opened the front door and
noticed the registration on the metal stripping over which the car door closed. The registra-
tion was later used in prosecuting Harris. The Court held that opening the door was reason-
able and the registration card was, therefore, in plain view. Id. at 235-36.
81. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. See also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). In Oliver,
the Supreme Court held that the Katz standard of reasonable expectation of privacy does not
extend to an open field owned by an individual. Id. at 181. Government intrusion on an open
field is not a search. Id. at 183.
82. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-80 (1984). The majority holding of open
access and visibility in Oliver is questionable in light of the characteristics of the field. This
open field had a locked gate at the entrance, a no trespassing sign and was highly secluded-
"bounded on all sides by woods, fences, and embankments and [could not] be seen from any
point of public access." Id. at 174. Thus, under the Oliver holding, even objects which are not
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The plain view doctrine also extends to a law enforcement officer's
use of some mechanical devices for sensory enhancement. Use of flash-
lights83 and binoculars84 has survived fourth amendment challenges on
this basis: "Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibit[s] the police
from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afford them ....,5
The balancing process may also affect the "probable cause" stan-
dard used once government intrusion on privacy rises to the level of a
search. For example, in Terry v. Ohio,86 the Supreme Court held that
officers may frisk a person they have stopped if they reasonably believe
the person is armed and dangerous.8 7 While the Court recognized that a
frisk is a search, the Court reasoned that the officer's need for self-protec-
tion coupled with the fact that a frisk is not a "full-blown" search war-
ranted a lesser standard than probable cause. 88
In sum, the extent of fourth amendment protection depends on the
balance struck between individual and government interests. While the
courts will protect the right to privacy, they will give significant weight
to governmental interests. In the balancing process, warrants may be
required or disposed of, the probable cause standard may be raised or
in plain view may not warrant fourth amendment protection. This extension of the plain view
doctrine illustrates the alarming erosion of fourth amendment rights in the name of govern-
ment interest in preventing crime.
83. Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970). The fact that an officer "used
a flashlight to pierce the nighttime darkness does not transform his obligation into a search....
The plain view rule does not go into hibernation at sunset." Id. at 189. See also Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) ('[U]se of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area
simply does not constitute a search.").
84. See, e.g., People v. Vermouth, 42 Cal. App. 3d 353, 361, 116 Cal. Rptr. 675, 680 (1974)
(use of binoculars to observe marijuana plant on deck visible from neighbor's yard held not a
search); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (observing
unloading of contraband from vehicles in the open held not a search), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974).
85. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (warrantless use of a beeper-an
electronic signaling device-to monitor movements of a non-contraband item in an automobile
over public highways not a search). But see United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305
(1984) (warrantless monitoring by beeper after device unwittingly taken into private residence
is a fourth amendment violation). See Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and
Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297 (1985).
86. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
87. Id. at 30. In Terry, a policeman, after observing Terry and two others apparently
"casing" a store, approached and asked for identification. When the suspects mumbled an
answer, the officer grabbed Terry, patted down the outside of his clothes, felt a pistol and
removed it. Id. at 5-7. Both the initial stop and the frisk were upheld. Id. at 30-31.
88. Id. at 24-25. "Unquestionably," Terry was entitled to constitutional protection as he
walked down the street. Id. at 9. The question was "whether in all circumstances of this on-
the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated." Id.
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lowered, and the definition of "search" may be narrowed or expanded.
Novel factual situations undergo judicial tailoring within this general
framework.
B. Are Sniffs Searches?
1. United States v. Place
In United States v. Place,9 the Supreme Court considered the fourth
amendment expectation of privacy in connection with a drug-detecting
dog's sniff of luggage at a public airport.90 In Place, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents in New York were notified by Miami law
enforcement officers that Place had acted suspiciously while at Miami
International Airport.91 Upon landing at La Guardia Airport, Place's
behavior again aroused suspicion.
89. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
90. Id. at 707. Prior to the Place decision, eight out of nine circuits which considered the
issue had held under similar facts that a dog sniff was not a search. See United States v. Race,
529 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1976) (air cargo warehouse sniff); United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d
370, 373 (2d Cir. 1982) (airport sniff), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); United States v.
Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir. 1980) (airport sniff), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981);
United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir.) (airport sniff), cert denied, 452 U.S.
962 (1981); United States v. Lewis, 708 F.2d 1078, 1080 (6th Cir. 1983) (airport sniff); United
States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 27 (7th Cir. 1980) (airport sniff); United States v. Bums, 624 F.2d
95, 101 (10th Cir.) (sniff in motel room), cert denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980); United States v.
Fulero, 498 F.2d 748, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (sniff at bus depot at port of entry). But see United
States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982) (airport sniff is a search), rev'd en banc, 736 F.2d
1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565 (1984). See infra note 138 for background of Beale.
Many state courts which had considered the issue prior to Place had also found the sniff
not to be a search. See State v. Morrow, 128 Ariz. 309, 312, 625 P.2d 898, 901 (1981) (airport
sniff); People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 342, 644 P.2d 810, 814, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 621
(1982) (airport sniff); State v. Groves, 65 Hawaii 104, 113, 649 P.2d 366, 372 (1982) (airport
sniff); People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 561, 431 N.E.2d 267, 269, 446 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (1981)
(airport sniff); State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 820, 598 P.2d 421, 425 (1979) (sniff of
package at bus station).
91. 462 U.S. at 698. DEA agents were no doubt attempting to determine whether Place fit
the drug courier profile-a subjective checklist which includes: arriving from a "source city,"
nervous behavior, a ticket purchased with cash, a ticket not purchased in the individual's
name, and possession of large, brand-new suitcases. For a discussion of the drug courier pro-
file, see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983).
In Place, Miami law enforcement officers approached Place as he proceeded to the gate
and asked for identification and his ticket. Place complied and consented to a search of his
checked luggage. The officers did not search the luggage, however, because of the imminent
departure of Place's plane. Place's remark to the officers that he recognized that they were
police prompted agents to examine the address tags on his bags. Discrepancies were noted in
the street addresses. Additional investigation revealed that the addresses were non-existent
and that Place had given a telephone number which belonged to a third address on the same
street. Miami officers then alerted New York DEA agents. 462 U.S. at 698.
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The DEA agents approached Place and informed him that they be-
lieved he might be carrying narcotics.92 When Place refused permission
to search his two bags, the agents told him they were going to take the
luggage in order to get a search warrant. The luggage was removed to
Kennedy Airport and subjected to a dog sniff test minutes later. The dog
"alerted" 93 to the smaller bag but reacted ambiguously to the larger bag.
A search warrant was later secured for the smaller bag. This bag con-
.tained 1.125 grams of cocaine.
94
The Supreme Court held that the dog sniff was not a search.95 Ini-
tially, the Court confirmed that the fourth amendment protects an indi-
vidual's privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage.96 However,
the Court reasoned that dog sniffs do not violate that privacy interest
because of their non-intrusive manner and their limited disclosure of in-
formation.97 Since luggage is a closed container, non-contraband items
are not exposed to public view.98 The sniff is "much less intrusive than a
typical search" because officers do not have to rummage through per-
92. At the time the agents identified themselves to Place, he responded that he had known
immediately that they were "cops." Place also told the agents his bags had already been
searched in Miami. The agents requested and received Place's identification. Id. at 698-99.
93. A dog "alerts" or "reacts positively" when it detects the scent of drugs in the air
surrounding the target. See United States v. Williams, 726 F.2d 661, 664 (10th Cir.) (airport
sniff not a search), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 3523 (1984). Classic alert behavior is to circle the
target. If the target is a suitcase, the dog might show interest by scratching and biting the
suitcase. Id.
94. Place, 462 U.S. at 699. The sniff in Place occurred late Friday afternoon. The agents
then retained the baggage until Monday morning when they conducted a search with a war-
rant. Id.
95. Id. at 707. The Court did find, however, that there was a seizure of Place's luggage.
Although a brief detention of personal effects is only minimally intrusive of fourth amendment
rights, given "strong countervailing governmental interests ... based only on specific articul-
able facts that the property contains contraband or evidence of a crime," the Court found the
length of detention of Place's luggage unreasonable in the absence of probable cause. Id. at
706-07.
96. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)). See supra notes 76-77
for a discussion of Chadwick.
97. Id. at 707. Some courts and commentators considered the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement on sniffs to be dictum and not binding. See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 731 F.2d
590, 593 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd en banc, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565
(1984). See infra note 138 for background of Beale. See also Note, United States v. Place: Is
There any Room in This Placefor a Sniffing Dog?, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 141 (1983). However, as
the Ninth Circuit pointed out in reversing Beale, 736 F.2d at 1291, the Supreme Court has
clearly directed courts to follow its pronouncement in Place. For example, in United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), the Court characterized its statement in Place as a holding,
stating that the "Court [in Place] held that subjecting luggage to a 'sniff test' by a trained
narcotics detection dog was not a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
at 123 (emphasis added) (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
98. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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sonal effects. 99 Further, only limited information regarding the presence
or absence of drugs is revealed. Therefore, a sniff insures that the owner
of the luggage is not embarrassed or inconvenienced. 1"° According to
the Court, a canine sniff is sui generis.10°
2. Implications of Place
After-Place, fact patterns developed that required courts to decide
the question of whether a sniff will ever violate the fourth amendment.
Some courts l"2 and commentators 10 3 have concluded that Place sanc-
tioned sniffs of all inanimate objects wherever they are located. Exam-
99. Id.
100. Id. It is arguable whether the sniffs "limited disclosure" insures that the owner of
luggage will not be embarrassed. For example, in one drug case, The Miami Herald reported
that dogs alerted to cocaine on part of $1.3 million in bills seized in connection with a money-
laundering operation. A witness for the defense, a toxicologist, attempted to show that all
money is tainted by analyzing money taken from seven different Florida banks. All of these
bills had traces of cocaine. Nonetheless, the defendant was convicted. Landers, Look who has
cocaine, The Miami Herald, Feb. 19, 1985, § C, at 1, col. 1.
The Miami Herald decided to conduct its own experiment. Eleven prominent citizens
(including Archbishop Edward McCarthy; Jeb Bush, Chairman of the Dade County Republi-
can Party; and Polly De Hirsh Meyer, Dade County philanthropist) volunteered $20 bills in
their possession for analysis. Of the 11 bills, 10 had traces of cocaine. (The eleventh bill had
been in circulation a very short time.) Cocaine is apparently so pervasive in Florida that most
people will be in daily contact with it via the money they handle. Id. at 2, col. 1.
While each of the 11 $20 bills contained only microscopic traces of cocaine, it is possible
for a drug detecting dog to alert to cocaine-tainted bills carried by innocent people. For exam-
ple, an alert to a businessman who is carrying a large amount of cash in his briefcase would
subject the businessman to the very "embarrassment and inconvenience" Place sought to
avoid. See also infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fallibility of
dogs.
101. The holding in Place has been criticized by commentators and judges. The Court's
decision on the sniff issue "can hardly be characterized as an informed one." 1 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 58, § 2.2(0, at 117 (Supp. 1985). The sniff issue should not have been decided since
it was never briefed or argued before the Court. Place, 462 U.S. at 711 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). Further, the issue was "wholly unnecessary to [the] judgment" since the Court "ulti-
mately held that the defendant's luggage had been impermissibly seized." United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 135 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Vermouth, No. CR 83-731 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1984) (un-
published Findings of Fact) (sniff of storage locker not a search) (relying on United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)), affid, No. 84-5111 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985) (unpublished opinion),
petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1985) (No. 85-966). See infra notes 106-
10 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 97, at 150, in which the author discusses
United States v. Beale, 731 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd en banc, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565 (1984), and notes, "[i]t appeared that the rationale behind the
Ninth Circuit decision was the mistaken belief that Place advocated dog sniff investigations
with few judicial guidelines."
103. See, e.g., Note, supra note 97, at 141. Place appeared to be the "death knell on the
issue of whether dog sniffing of inanimate objects in a public place invoked the Fourth Amend-
ment." Id.
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pies of thatview in practice are United States v. Vermouth " and United
States v. DiCesare.1
0 5
In Vermouth, a sniff of a rented locker at a private storage facility
was held not to be a search. 10 6 Despite the defendant's apparent attempt
to insure privacy-the defendant's locker was locked and the facility was
protected by an elaborate security system' 07-- the district court held that
the use of dogs to determine the contents of his locker did not violate
Vermouth's expectation of privacy.'08 According to the court, the hold-
ing in Place was "persuasive and binding" and a factor which "convinced
the court that the employment of a narcotic detection dog to sniff a stor-
age locker did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."' 19 In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied Place to private areas, contending that any difference between dog
searches in private as opposed to public areas would be "a distinction
without significance."" 0
104. No. CR 83-731 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1984) (unpublished Findings of Fact), af'd, No.
84-5111 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985) (unpublished opinion), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3912 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1985) (No. 85-966).
105. 765 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985).
106. No. CR 83-731, record at 48. In early 1983, the Santa Barbara Sheriff's Office was
investigating burglaries at various storage sheds in and around Goleta, California, a commu-
nity approximately 10 miles north of Santa Barbara. The break-ins were approximately 30
miles from the storage facility involved in this case. During the investigation of these burgla-
ries, the sheriff's office, suspecting that the burglaries might be related to storage of marijuana,
arranged to bring United States Customs' drug detecting dogs to Santa Barbara to search The
Storage Place, a facility where defendant had rented a locker. No burglaries had occurred
there. Id. at 19-21.
The owner of the storage facility gave permission for the dogs to enter the property. The
dogs were allowed to randomly search up and down the rows of storage lockers and conse-
quently alerted to several storage lockers. The agents then obtained search warrants for the
lockers. Upon opening defendant's locker, a late-model Mercedes was discovered. Id. at 34.
The agents pushed the car out of the locker and, after an hour, and with the help of the storage
facility's owner, pried open the trunk. Among other incriminating evidence found in the trunk
were two locked footlockers containing approximately 50 pounds of cocaine. Id. at 35.
107. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3-4 n.1, United States v. Vermouth, No. 84-5111 (9th
Cir. Aug. 9, 1985),petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1985) (No. 85-966).
The elaborate security system was designed to insure that not even the public could enter the
grounds of The Storage Place. The facility was surrounded by a wire fence topped by four
separate strands of barbed wire. The entry gate was locked at all times and access was limited
by a push-button combination lock. Each time that entry was made, a record of the entry
printed out on a tape. Additionally, a film record was made of each car entering the premises.
After business hours, the facility was patrolled by four guard dogs inside and one dog outside
the fence. Unlike some other storage businesses, The Storage Place was only open during
normal business hours and even customers could not enter after hours. Id.
108. No. CR 83-73 1, record at 48.
109. Id. at 48-49 (emphasis added). The Storage Place, however, is clearly distinguishable
from a "public" place such as the airport in Place. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110. United States v. Loomis, No. 84-5167 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985) (unpublished opinion)
May 1986] DOG SNIFF SEARCHES 1113
In DiCesare, the court held that a sniff of a car trunk did not violate
the defendant's fourth amendment rights."11 The Ninth Circuit did not
consider whether the owner of the car had a privacy interest in the trunk
of the car or whether the sniff occurred in a "public place." Rather, the
court, relying on Place, disposed of the entire issue in one sentence: "The
canine's sniff of the trunk was not 'a search' requiring probable cause."112
Extending or relying on Place in this manner raises the Orwellian
spectre of 1984.113 As Justice Brennan stated in United States v. Jacob-
sen:114 Under the rationale of Place, "if a device were developed that
could detect, from the outside of a building, the presence of cocaine in-
side, there would be no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising
through a residential neighborhood and using the device to identify all
homes in which the drug is present."'
15
(consolidated with United States v. Vermouth, No. 84-5111 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985) (unpub-
lished opinion), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1985) (No. 85-966)).
However, as the petition for the writ of certiorari stated:
If this Court sanctions the use of dogs to search hundreds of storage lockers in a
high-security area without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, it is not unreason-
able to expect that prosecutors will come before this Court tomorrow with the argu-
ment that after obtaining permission from the landlord dogs can run down the halls
of security apartment buildings examining the doors of all of the residential units.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, United States v. Vermouth, No. 84-5111 (9th Cir. Aug. 9,
1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1985) (No. 85-966).
111. 765 F.2d at 897. Police had observed DiCesare and an associate, Flannery, drive in
DiCesare's car to the home of a suspected drug dealer. DiCesare then went to Flannery's
apartment, took Flannery's car, returned home and placed a suitcase in the trunk of Flannery's
car. A drug detecting dog was brought in in order to sniff the trunk. The dog's positive alert,
the suspicious activity of DiCesare and Flannery preceding the alert, and a record of secretive
meetings at which DiCesare participated and appeared to be using cocaine provided the evi-
dence to establish probable cause for issuing warrants to search DiCesare's apartment, and
Flannery's car and apartment. The suitcase in Flannery's trunk contained a balance scale and
six pounds of cocaine. Flannery's apartment contained cocaine, drug paraphernalia and notes
related to cocaine trafficking. Id. at 893-94.
112. 765 F.2d at 897 (citations omitted). It appears that the Ninth Circuit finally acqui-
esced to Place's "no-search" rationale after a tedious encounter with the Supreme Court over
the issue in United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565 (1984).
See infra note 138. Beale and Place, however, were factually similar. In contrast, the facts in
DiCesare are distinguishable from both Place and Beale. See supra notes 91-94 and accompa-
nying text for discussion of facts of Place; see infra note 138 for discussion of facts of Beale.
113. G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949). In 1984, Orwell explores the bleak prospects of a fictional
totalitarian state. Id. See also United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd en
banc, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565 (1984). "Nothing would invoke the
spectre of a totalitarian police state as much as the indiscriminate blanket use of trained dogs."
Id. at 1336 n.20.
114. 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984).
115. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Jacobsen, DEA agents took a small sample of powder
from a package addressed to the defendant which had been intercepted by Federal Express.
The agents submitted the contents to a chemical field test to determine whether the substance
was cocaine. Id. at 111-12. The Court held that no violation of any legitimate interest in
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In addition to sanctioning sniffs of all inanimate objects, the talis-
manic words of Place could justify dogs being brought into people's
homes "to sniff and bite our clothes, beds, chairs, cradles, or whatever
other possessions we keep in our homes."" 6 For example, in DiCesare,
defendant Marin was arrested with defendant DiCesare in DiCesare's
apartment.117 Soon afterwards, the police went to Marin's apartment 1 8
and found a large green suitcase in plain view.1 19 The police secured the
premises and brought a drug detecting dog into the apartment. The dog
reacted positively to the suitcase. Based on the sniff and the holding in
Place, a search warrant was issued for the suitcase and apartment.12 0
The defense in DiCesare advanced an argument that it is inappropri-
ate to bring german shepherd drug detecting dogs into a private resi-
dence."l ' The Ninth Circuit considered the issue irrelevant to the case
and rejected the argument.122 The majority suggested that had they ad-
dressed the issue, they would have found that the invasion of homes by
dogs might not be terribly offensive.12 3 The majority's suggestion that
privacy occurred because the chemical test merely disclosed the absence or presence of contra-
band. Id. at 123. The Court analogized the chemical test to sniff tests which are not fourth
amendment violations and stated that the holding was "dictated" by Place. Id. at 123-24.
The dissent viewed the majority as having adopted a general rule that a surveillance tech-
nique does not constitute a search if it only reveals whether or not an individual possesses
contraband. Id. at 136-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, such a rule
would support much more intrusive searches since the use of the technique, accuracy of the
technique and the privacy interest upon which it intrudes would become irrelevant, as the
emphasis shifted to the nature of the object of the search and its legality or illegality. Id.
116. DiCesare, 765 F.2d at 901 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 894. The government began investigating DiCesare in January 1983, after
DiCesare and his wife insisted on depositing large amounts of cash in a Los Angeles bank but
refused to file mandatory currency reports. In July 1983, the police seized approximately 33
pounds of cocaine in a hotel room. DiCesare arrived at the hotel room and was arrested but
later released. He was placed under surveillance and secretive meetings were observed. Id. at
893. DiCesare's apartment was subsequently searched pursuant to a warrant. Large quanti-
ties of cash, cocaine, other narcotics trafficking paraphernalia and seveial envelopes containing
large amounts of money addressed to an attorney were found in the apartment. Id. at 894.
118. Id. The avowed purpose of their entrance was to return a small child who was with
Marin at the time of his arrest. Id.
119. For a discussion of the plain view doctrine, see supra notes 80-85 and accompanying
text.
120. 765 F.2d at 896-97.
121. Id. at 897.
122. Id. The court concluded that they did not need to reach that issue. Id.
123. Id. at 899-900 n.1; id. at 903 n.1 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). In a scathing concurring
opinion, Judge Reinhardt took the majority to task for failing to address an activity which was
"an unprecedented and outrageous violation of individual rights." Id. at 901 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring). Raising 1984 concerns, Judge Reinhardt stated that the image of the police state
was as clear as it was in Nazi Germany when dogs were used by Hitler to locate Jews in order
to complete the "Final Solution." Id. at 902 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). "The intrusion of...
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invasion of homes may not be terribly offensive, coupled with its decision
not to address the issue at all, reinforces the attitude of law enforcement
officials' and the public that dogs may be legally used for almost any
purpose.
125
Place also may serve as the foundation for even more abusive use of
dogs. Dogs may not be limited to sniffing objects-whether in public
places or in homes.' 2 6 Mass sniffs of people may be -permitted as the
government's interest in curtailing drug traffic grows. This type of con-
duct is-not a fanciful hypothetical. Even before Place was decided, an
exploratory search of an entire student population was approved in Doe
v. Renfrow.127 There, during a two and one-half hour investigation, 2780
students in an Indiana secondary school were sniffed in response to the
fear of a growing drug problem.
128
[Students] were required to sit quietly in their seats with their
belongings in view and their hands upon their desks. They
were forbidden to use the washroom unless accompanied by an
escort....
The dogs were led up and down each aisle of the class-
room, from desk to desk, and from student to student. Each
student was probed,_sniffed,-and inspected by at least 1 of the
dogs is... reminiscent of the ugliest types of scenes that have occurred in police states." Id. at
901 (Reinhardt, J., concurring)..
124. "[The Los Angeles Police Department apparently believes it is free to use dogs to
search people's homes, [and] the United States Attorney agrees.. . ." Id. at 901 (Reinhardt,
J., concurring).
125. For example, as part of a drug crackdown, Capital Cities-ABC, Inc. announced that it
would send drug detecting dogs into its newspaper and television offices. Publisher Reconsiders
Using Drug-Sniffing Dogs, L.A. Herald Examiner, Jan. 13, 1986, at A6, col. 1. After receiving
a petition signed by 50 reporters, the publisher of the Kansas City Star and Kansas City Times
stated, "[i]f this is going to cause anybody discomfort, I'm certainly willing to sit down and
talk about it." Id. The issue of the legality of bringing in the dogs was noticeably absent from
this article.
126. Many courts have already expressed approval of random dragnet searches. See State
v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 818, 598 P.2d 421, 424 (1979) (allowing indiscriminate, ex-
ploratory search of a Greyhound bus packaging area where release of odors from defendant's
package negated expectation of privacy). See also Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D.
Ind. 1979) (approving mass sniffs of school children), rev'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 91 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); State v. Morrow, 128 Ariz. 309, 311, 625 P.2d
898, 900 (1981) (upholding random sniffs at airport by dog whose handler was just keeping
dog in practice).
127. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
128. Id. at 1015. From September 1978 to March 1979, school officials recorded 21 in-
stances of drug-related incidents among the students. Thirteen such incidents occurred within
the four-week period prior to the sniff. Additionally, during the same four-week period faculty
and parents reported daily concern over the drug problem. Id.
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14 german shepherds detailed to the school. When the search
team assigned to petitioner's classroom reached petitioner, the
police dog pressed forward, sniffed at her body, and repeatedly
pushed its nose and muzzle into her legs. The uniformed officer
then ordered petitioner to stand and empty her pockets, appar-
ently because the dog "alerted" to the presence of drugs....
The dog again sniffed her body, and again it apparently
"alerted." Petitioner was then escorted to the nurse's office for
a more thorough physical inspection.
*.. After denying that she had ever used marihuana, peti-
tioner was ordered to strip. She did so, removing her clothing
in the presence of... two women. The women then looked
over petitioner's body, inspected her clothing, and touched and
examined the hair on her head. Again, no drugs were found.
Petitioner was subsequently allowed to dress and was escorted
back to her classroom. 129
The district court held that the sniffing by a trained drug detecting canine
as reasonable and not a search."' 30 Although the Renfrow holding has
been criticized and rejected by several courts, 3 ' the Supreme Court re-
fused certiorari in Renfrow 132 and has never decided the issue.
Although the majority in Place stressed the non-intrusive nature of
the sniff technique as applied to an inanimate object, a heightened gov-
ernmental interest in the prevention of drug trafficking might be used to
justify a diminished expectation of privacy in an individual's body.'
33
Under this approach, law enforcement officers could stand in an airport
129. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1023-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(footnote omitted). The dogs alerted 50 times. However, only 17 students were in possession
of contraband. Id. It is interesting to note that the dog who alerted to the plaintiff was appar-
ently reacting to the lingering odor on plaintiff's body of plaintiff's dog who was in heat. Id. at
1024 n.1. See infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text for discussion of reliability and valid-
ity of dogs.
130. 475 F. Supp. at 1022.
131. See, eg., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir.
1982) (dog sniff of students in class was a search), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983). There
the dogs actually "put their noses right up against the children's bodies." Id. at 478-79. "In-
tentional close proximity sniffing of the person is offensive whether the sniffer be canine or
human[,]" particularly when done to an adolescent. Id. at 479. See also Jones v. Latexco
Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980). There, the court held that a sniff of
public school students was a search because the dog was able to "detect odors completely
outside the range of the human sense of smell [which] replaced, rather than enhanced, the
perceptive abilities of school officials." Id. at 232-33 (footnote omitted).
132. 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
133. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of Renfrow. See also
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985). There, the Supreme Court
held that reasonable suspicion of alimentary canal drug smuggling was sufficient to support a
1116
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and have dogs sniff every arriving and departing passenger. The govern-
ment would assert that a sniff test is less intrusive than a full search or a
strip search. Indeed, the court in Renfrow found the sniff of a person not
to be intrusive at all.' Arguably, then, Place could be extended to the
ultimate invasion-people sniffing.
16-hour detention of an individual in order to have her produce a bowel movement. Id. at
3311.
Customs inspectors concluded that de Hernandez fit the drug courier profile and was a
balloon swallower-a person who smuggles drugs by swallowing balloons filled with drugs.
Id. at 3307. She arrived at Los Angeles Airport with $5000 in cash and no hotel reservations.
She stated that the purpose of her trip was to purchase goods for her husband's store in Bo-
gota, but had no appointments with vendors.
Subsequent to a strip search, she was given the option of returning to Colombia, agreeing
to an x-ray or remaining under detention until she produced a monitored bowel movement.
She chose to return to Bogota, but was unable to be placed on a plane the next morning. The
inspectors then told her that she would be detained. Sixteen hours after she had landed, she
had not produced a bowel movement. Id. at 3307-08. She had refused all food and drink and
exhibited signs of discomfort "consistent with 'heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of na-
ture.'" Id. at 3308 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1371
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985)). A court order was then sought and a rectal
examination was performed. A balloon containing a foreign substance was removed. De Her-
nandez was arrested and shortly thereafter passed 88 balloons containing 528 grams of co-
caine. Id.
The Supreme Court stated that the fourth amendment balance between government inter-
ests and individual privacy rights is "struck much more favorably to the Government at the
border," id. at 3310, and that governmental interests "in stopping smuggling at the border are
high indeed." Id. at 3311.
The dissent characterized the entire episode as "'disgusting and saddening.'" Id. at 3313
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973) (Ely,
J., dissenting) ("disrobing and search of a woman by United States border police")). The
dissent further stated:
[I] do not imagine that decent and law abiding international travelers have yet
reached the point where they "expect" to be thrown into locked rooms and ordered
to excrete into wastebaskets, held incommunicado until they cooperate, or led away
in handcuffs to the nearest hospital for exposure to various medical procedures-all
on nothing more than the "reasonable suspicion of low ranking enforcement
agents ....
[ T]he crux of my disagreement is this: We have learned in our lifetimes,
time and time again, the inherent dangers that result from coupling unchecked "law
enforcement" discretion with the tools of medical technology.
Id. at 3321-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. The court in Renfrow noted the diminished aspect of privacy inherent in a public
school and the school's right and duty to supervise. 475 F. Supp. at 1022. "'The student's
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure must be balanced with the necessity for
the school officials to be able. to maintain order and discipline in their schools and to fulfill
their duties under the in loco parentis doctrine to protect the health and welfare of their stu-
dents.'" Id. at 1023 (quoting M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D. Ill. 1977)).
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C. The Thomas Limitation
1. The Thomas decision
In United States v. Thomas,135 the Second Circuit limited law en-
forcement use of dogs by holding that a sniff does violate the fourth
amendment in certain situations, specifically, where the sniff is of a per-
son's home.13 6 The validity of Thomas, however, is questionable because
the Supreme Court in United States v. Place 137 seemingly closed the door
on the sniff issue." 8 turther, despite the Second Circuit's attempt to
135. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985); see supra notes 38-56 for a
thorough discussion of Thomas and its majority and minority opinions.
136. Id. at 1366-67.
137. 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
138. The history of Beale is illustrative. The Ninth Circuit reached the conclusion that dog
sniffs are not searches after a tedious encounter with the Supreme Court on this issue. "I think-
[Place) leaves no room for application of the fourth amendment to dog sniffs of luggage located
in a public place." United States v. Beale (Beale I1), 731 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1983) (foot-
note omitted) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), withdrawn, 728 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.), rev'd en bane,
736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565 (1984).
Prior to Place, the Ninth Circuit had been the only circuit which had considered the issue
to hold that a sniff is a search. See supra note 90. Based on a fact situation similar to Place,
the Ninth Circuit had held that a sniff is a fourth amendment intrusion. United States v. Beale
(Beale I), 674 F.2d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 463 U.S.
1202 (1983), vacated and remanded, Beale II, 731 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1983), withdrawn, 728
F.2d 411 (9th Cir.), rev'd en banc, Beale III, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
565 (1984). Beale had aroused suspicion at a Florida airport. A detective approached Beale
and a male companion, asked some questions and left. The detective then went to the baggage
area and ordered Beale's luggage "sniffed." The dog alerted to Beale's suitcase. Authorities in
San Diego were notified since Beale and his companion had already boarded a San Diego
bound plane. Beale I, at 1328-29.
At the San Diego airport, another dog alerted to Beale's suitcase and Beale and his com-
panion were arrested. Subsequently, a search pursuant to a warrant uncovered approximately
961 grams of cocaine in Beale's shoulder bag and approximately 137 grams of marijuana in his
suitcase. Id. at 1329.
The Ninth Circuit held that the "use of a canine's keen sense of smell to detect the pres-
ence of contraband within personal luggage is a Fourth Amendment intrusion, albeit a limited
one that may be conducted without a warrant and which may be based on an officer's
'founded' or 'articulable' suspicion rather than probable cause." Id. at 1335 (emphasis in origi-
nal) (footnotes omitted).
The government petitioned for certiorari and the United States Supreme Court vacated
and remanded for reexamination, in light of Place, 462 U.S. 626 (1983). United States v.
Beale, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983). On remand, in Beale II, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Place.
Beale II, 731 F.2d at 592. The Beale II court determined that Place focused on:
"(1) [w]hether the seizure and detention of a traveler's luggage, located in an airport, may be
effected without a warrant and on less than probable cause; and (2) if so, to what extent the
seizure and detention are limited by the Fourth Amendment." Id. Beale II focused on a
different issue-under conditions where there is a detention of luggage, is a sniff a fourth
amendment intrusion? The court noted that "no federal court has yet upheld a canine investi-
gation in the face of a record demonstrating a lack of prior individualized suspicion." Id, at
594 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The court interpreted the statement in Place,
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distinguish Place in Thomas, the factual situations in the two cases are
arguably more similar than disparate. First, in Thomas, the area outside
defendant Wheelings' apartment, Whether it was a hallway or a street,
was a public place; the dog did not enter the apartment, but only sniffed
the air outside.139 Second, the sniff itself, as in Place, was limited to .the
detection of the presence or absence of contraband.1" Finally, since no
officer "rummaged" through Wheelings' apartment, he was saved embar-
rassment. The conduct in Thomas, then, fits neatly into the Place defini-
tion of a sniff-a limited, discriminate, non-intrusive, non-embarrassing
investigatory technique which occurred in a public place.
However, despite the appearance of irreconcilability, Thomas is con-
sistent with Place because of the Second Circuit's narrow interpretation
of the Supreme Court's holding. By reasoning, that Place only applied to
airport sniffs, the Second Circuit was able to find that sniffs which take
place at locations other than airports necessitate different treatment. 141
that a sniff is not a search, Place, 463 U.S. at 707, as dictum and decided that the dictum must
be viewed in the whole context of the Place decision, rather than in isolation. The Ninth
Circuit then reiterated its prior position of requiring articulable suspicion prior to a sniff. Id.
at 593, 595. "The effect of holding that a canine sniff investigation requires no articulable
suspicion in circumstances in which the luggage is not detained... in order [to sniff], would be
to encourage the indiscriminate use of roving trained dogs at public airports. We decline to
reach this result." Id. at 595 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded.
Id. at 596.
The panel's decision was subsequently withdrawn and a hearing en banc was granted.
United States v. Beale, 728 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1984). On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit
held, according to Place, that the sniff of Beale's luggage was not a search. United States v.
Beale (Beale II1), 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565 (1984). Beale was
neither detained nor inconvenienced in any way. Id. at 1292. Interference with his luggage
was de minimus. Id. Finally, the sniff, according to the court, disclosed only the presence or
absence of contraband. Id. at 1291.
Dissenting, Judge Pregerson stated the following:
[The majority] denigrates the reasonable expectation of privacy that travelers retain
in their luggage. Second, it fails adequately to explain how an obvious intrusion into
someone's personal effects-his suitcases-is not a search. Finally, [it] never even
reaches the critical question... : whether the sniff, if not a full-blown search, none-
theless constitutes an investigatory stop triggering the more modest Fourth Amend-
ment standards of Terry v. Ohio.
Id. at 1292 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). See supra
notes 86-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Terry.
139. 757 F.2d at 1367.
140. The Supreme Court in Place considered limited disclosure dispositive. "[ithe sniff
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item." 462 U.S. at 707. For
an opposing viewpoint, see infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text. A technique that deter-
mines only the presence or absence of contraband may be less intrusive than a traditional
technique. However, "the fact remains that such a technique does intrude." United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 141 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366.
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2. The expectation of privacy
In Place, the Supreme Court focused primarily on the manner and
degree of the government intrusion inherent in a dog sniff search.1 42 The
majority there reasoned that the defendant was not embarrassed by the
dog sniff since the intrusion was limited and discriminating.1 43 There-
fore, no fourth amendment protection was warranted.
144
In contrast, the Second Circuit's approach in Thomas, focused on
whether and to what extent the sniff infringed on the defendant's expec-
tation of privacy. Relying on United States v. Katz,1 45 the Second Circuit
began its analysis by considering whether the defendant, Wheelings, had
an expectation of privacy which society would tolerate. 146 The Thomas
court recognized that the result in Place could be justified by the already
diminished expectation of privacy attached to luggage consigned to a
common carrier at a public airport. 147 By consigning luggage to a carrier
at an airport, individuals partially relinquish their privacy interests.
1 48
The luggage will be handled by many people, pushed, prodded and possi-
bly ripped and opened. 49 Further, in order to prevent skyjacking, lug-
142. 462 U.S. at 707. "[IThe manner in which information is obtained through this investi-
gative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search." Id. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, failed to consider the Ninth Circuit's view that the degree of intrusiveness has no effect
on the individual's expectation of privacy. United States v. Beale (Beale 1I), 731 F.2d 590, 595
(9th Cir. 1983), rev'd en banc, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565 (1984); see
supra note 138 for a complete discussion of the history and significance of Beale.
143. 462 U.S. at 707. The sniff, then, was considered suigeneris. Id. But see United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 136 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting), in which the dissent noted,
"[njeither the Court's knowledge nor its imagination regarding criminal investigative tech-
niques proved very sophisticated, for within one year [after Place] we have learned of another
investigative procedure that shares with the dog sniff the same defining characteristics that led
the Court to suggest that the dog sniff was not a search." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
supra note 115 for a discussion of Jacobsen.
144. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. But see Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in which he
stated: "While the Court has adopted one plausible analysis of the issue, there are others. For
example, a dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified ...
upon mere reasonable suspicion." Id. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
145. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see supra note 41.
146. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366.
147. Id.
148. See United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918
(1976). "There can be no reasonable expectation of privacy when one transports baggage by
plane, particularly today when the menace to public safety by the skyjacker and the passage of
dangerous or hazardous freight compels continuing scrutiny of passengers and their impedi-
mentia." Id. at 462. See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1976). "Luggage con-
tents are not open to public view, except as a condition to a border entry or common carrier
travel." Id. at 13.
149. Expectation of privacy with respect to luggage "declines as the anticipated public ac-
cess to the baggage increases." United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 465 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Mansfield, J., concurring), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
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gage is screened by x-ray machines and may be opened.1 50 Yet, "homes"
are specifically designated by the fourth amendment for heightened pro-
tective treatment and the courts have historically recognized that protec-
tion.1 51 The Thomas court conceded that a sniff at an airport may not be
considered a search, but explained that a practice which is not intrusive
in a public airport may be intrusive "at a person's home." '52 Since the
sniff related to Wheelings' home, the court concluded that he had a
heightened expectation of privacy.
153
It may be irrefutable that the most stringent constitutional protec-
tion is afforded the interior of a home. However, the sniff in Thomas did
not occur inside Wheelings' apartment. 54 Nonetheless, the holding is
based on the rationale that individuals have an expectation that the con-
tents of their homes will not be sensed by a device outside their homes.
A closed door should convey the same message as closed drapes or win-
dow shades-privacy is anticipated. Wheelings, unlike Place, did not ex-
pose the contents of his apartment to the public. He did not surrender a
modicum of his expectation of privacy. Implicit in the Second Circuit's
holding in Thomas is the recognition that the reduction in the privacy
interest directly corresponds to the increased governmental interest at
stake. For example, since major airports are commonly used to smuggle
large amounts of contraband, 55 the governmental interest in curbing
drug smuggling may have a high priority at an airport. However, the
150. The high governmental interest in preventing skyjacking also justifies magnetometer
searches at airports. Magnetometers ascertain whether there is metal in a hidden space by
detecting changes in the magnetic field surrounding the area of the hidden space. United
States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring), cert denied,
424 U.S. 918 "(1976). Courts have consistently held that use of a magnetometer to detect
metal, is minimally intrusive. See, e.g., United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
151. A reasonable expectation of privacy in one's home has been recognized as traditional
and fundamental.
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat
thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him without
disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty-worth protecting
from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis,
some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some in-
violate place which is a man's castle.
United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted), affid, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
This zone of privacy is also clearly defined in constitutional terms: "The right of the
people to be secure in their... houses ... shall not be violated...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
152. 757 F.2d at 1366.
153. Id. at 1367.
154. Id. at 1366. In fact, the sniff occurred outside Wheelings' apartment. Id.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983).
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same governmental concerns are simply not present when a person's
home is involved.
3. The plain view doctrine
Notwithstanding the recognized constitutional protection tradition-
ally afforded the home, the plain view doctrine could have operated to
reduce Wheelings' legitimate expectation of privacy.156 If the contents of
Wheelings' apartment were "knowingly exposed" to the public, no con-
stitutional protection would be available.' 57 For example, if Wheelings
left his door wide open and a police officer walked by, glanced in and saw
evidence of criminal activity, no search would have occurred. In fact,
strict analysis of the search of Wheelings' apartment under the plain view
doctrine leads to the conclusion that the sniff was properly considered a
search. Nothing inside Wheelings' apartment was directly observable by
a policeman 5 ' and Wheelings did not "knowingly expose" the contents
of his apartment to the general public. 159
Courts which have addressed the plain view doctrine in connection
with dog sniffs have held, however, that observable sights encompass de-
tectable odors. 60 The courts adopting the "plain smell" doctrine hold
156. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text describing and explaining the plain view
doctrine.
157. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
158. The Supreme Court is currently deciding the issue of whether government agents may
conduct warrantless overflights of private property to collect information to which they ordi-
narily would not be privy. California v. Ciraolo, No. 84-1513 (U.S. argued Dec. 10, 1985), 38
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4123 (Dec. 18, 1985). In Ciraolo, the police had received an anonymous
tip that defendant had marijuana plants growing in his backyard. The on-foot investigation
was unsuccessful because the yard was enclosed by a six foot fence and an inner 10 foot fence.
The police officer then flew over the yard at 1000 feet, observed the marijuana plants and
photographed them. Subsequently, he procured a search warrant and seized the plants. Coun-
sel for the government argued that the defendant's plants were not concealed from public view
and police may use their own eyes to detect criminal activity. Id. at 4124.
During defendant's argument, Justice O'Connor commented, "[w]ell, it may be in this age
of air travel, that anyone who doesn't cover his backyard is waiving his privacy expectation."
Id. at 4124. Counsel for defense argued that the "Fourth Amendment is the protection against
the 'shroud of darkness' that the government wishes to place over the backyards of America."
Id. at 4125.
159. See People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 349, 644 P.2d 810, 818, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617,
625 (1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). There, the Chief Justice argued that contraband in luggage
that was sniffed was not exposed to the public unless the "public" is interpreted as "meaning
specially trained dogs." Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Nor did the appellant in that case know-
ingly expose "contraband to the public, since he, not being a... trained dog himself, would
not have known that any aroma was escaping from his luggage." Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
160. See, eg., United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1975) (sniff not a
search), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
If the police officers here had detected the aroma of the drug through their own
olfactory senses, there could be no serious contention that their sniffing in the area of
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that if an odor is detectable, if it wafts in the air, it is essentially in plain
view.
161
Although the Thomas court did not explicitly refer to the plain view
doctrine, the court did address the doctrine through the related issue of
sensory enhancement. The majority in Thomas implicitly recognized
that there are tengions between sensory enhancement and fourth amend-
ment rights that are difficult to reconcile. According to the court, a sniff
of a home discloses to law enforcement officers information about the
contents of a home that they could not obtain by using their own
senses. 162 The use of a dog is "not a mere improvement 'of their sense of
smell, as ordinary eyeglasses improve vision, but is a significant enhance-
ment accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory instru-
ment."' 163 While individuals might reasonably expect that the odors of
the bags would be tantamount to an unlawful search.... We fail to understand how
the detection of the odoriferous drug by the use of the sensitive and schooled canine
senses here employed alters the situation and renders the police procedure constitu-
tionally suspect.
Id. (citatidns omitted).
161. See, e.g., State v. Goodley, 381 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)(defendant
had "no constitutionally cognizable right to the inviolability of the aromatic molecules which
surrounded his luggage"); State v. Rogers, 43 N.C. App. 475, 480, 259 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1979)
(dog sniff of defendant's safety deposit box in bank not a search but rather "monitoring of the
air in an area open to the public'!); People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 431 N.E.2d 267, 269,
446 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (1981) (when scent is released into air, one has no expectation of pri-
vacy in items or surrounding air).
162. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1367. The officers were unable to detect any odor of narcotics
'using their own senses. It is noteworthy that although the dog "alerted," no drugs were found
inside Wheelings' apartment. Id. at 1366. See infra notes 165 & 169-83 and accompanying
text for a discussion on reliability and validity of dogs.
163. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1367. A dog cannot be compared to a flashlight or binoculars.
See supra ndtes 83-84 and accompanying text. Sniffs more closely resemble electronic eaves-
dropping devices and as such should be considered searches.
[N]o real distinction can be drawn between the use of specially trained dogs with
superior olfactoty powers and the use of an electronic instrument which registers a
smell which a human cannot perceive. In this respect... [the sniff] is comparable to
[the electronic eavesdropping of] Katz where the electronic device attached to the
outside of the enclosed telephone booth constituted a search even though there was
no physical intrusion into the enclosure.
State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 311, 354 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1976) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 1 (1968); see supra note 41). The government agents in Katz were "merely
gathering that which 'leaked' out of the phone booth into 'the airspace surrounding' the tele-
phone booth. Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment was held to apply to their activities."
People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 351, 644 P.2d 810, 820, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 627 (1982)
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
See also United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (monitoring of beeper in private
home was a search); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield,
J., concurring) (The police officers' senses were "replaced by the more sensitive nose of the dog
in the same manner that a police officer's ears are replaced by a hidden microphone in areas
where he could not otherwise hear because of the inaudibility of the sounds."), cert. denied,
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corned beef and cabbage would drift outside their dwellings and alert
passersby to the dinner menu, they do have a legitimate expectation that
the contents of their apartments would otherwise remain private" and
would not be "sensed" from outside their doors by a device more than
forty times more sensitive than a human nose. 6
The Thomas court found that the dramatic sensory enhancement by
the dog's nose precluded use of the plain view doctrine in this case as an
exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover, unlike the Supreme
Court in Place, the Second Circuit realized that an individual's expecta-
tion of privacy and subsequent fourth amendment protection should not
be dependent on the sophistication of available technology. 66
D. The Fallibility of Dogs
While the Second Circuit appropriately analyzed the sniff in United
States v. Thomas 167 under traditional search and seizure principles, the
424 U.S. 918 (1976). The Karo Court concluded that while the electronic monitoring device
was less intrusive than a full search, it also revealed facts that the government was interested in
knowing but could not have discovered without a warrant. 104 S. Ct. at 3303-04.
164. "'[S]urely there comes a point where it can be said that a person has "justifiably re-
lied" upon the privacy of his premises even though he has not taken the extraordinary step of
sealing off every minute aperture in that structure.'" People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 349,
644 P.2d 810, 819, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 626 (1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (quoting I W.
LAFAVE, supra note 59, at 253-54 (footnote omitted)).
165. See United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd en banc, 736
F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565 (1984). The court recognized the dog's sup-
erior olfactory capabilities, but erred in its mathematics. It stated that the dog's nose is eight
times more sensitive than the human nose. Id. In fact, a human has approximately five mil-
lion olfactory sensory cells inside the nose; a german shepherd dog has approximately 220
million. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, § I.G.5, at 34. Almost one-eighth of the dog's
brain and more than one-half of the internal nose is olfactory. In sharp contrast, the human
olfactory lobes are considerably smaller and the area of cells is one square inch. Id. at 33.
166. As Justice Brandeis has stated:
In the application of a .Constitution... our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be....
... Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court
of what is whispered in the closet.
... Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without re-
moving papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in the court and by which it
will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home....
Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of indi-
vidual security?
... The makers of our Constitution ... conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone .... To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
167. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985).
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court inaccurately characterized dog sniffs as a discriminating tech-
nique.168 A dog is simply not the limited and discriminate instrument
assumed by both the Place 169 and the PhomasJ7° courts. There is a fur-
ther fundamental, factual inaccuracy in the premise- accepted by courts
that dogs are infallible instruments.
Although courts concede the necessity of a well-trained, reliable and
accurate dog to perform a sniff, there are no uniform recognized stan-
dards among the courts to define theswe rms. 171 The Second Circuit has
found that a dog's alert to luggage established probable cause given the
dog's record of correctly alerting to drugs one hundred percent of the
time.172 However, the Fifth Circuit has stated that a less than one hun-
dred percent record would suffice.173  An explosives-trained detection
dog with no drug sniffing training has even been found to be acceptable
by the Tenth Circuit.174
To compound the problem, trained dogs alert to substances other
than contraband. 175 Therefore, a mistaken alert may also cause embar-
168. Id. at 1366-67. See infra note 170.
169. 462 U.S. at 707. The Supreme Court simply assumes the dog is reliable. Id.
170. 757 F.2d at 1366-67. Although the Second Circuit did not have to reach the issue of
reliability under the facts before it, the court did comment that a dog sniff is a discriminating
method since it discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics. Id.
171. Additionally, although courts use the words "reliability" and "accuracy" interchange-
ably, they are not synonymous. In order for a test to be valid, it must be reliable; however, the
converse is not true, for results can be entirely consistent without predicting anything. See A.
ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 71-78, 99-157 (3d ed. 1968) for a thorough discussion of
reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the degree to which a test consistently yields the
same results regardless of the validity of predictions. Id. at 71. Accuracy is subsumed under
validity. Validity is the degree to which a test predicts or measures accurately that which it is
supposed to predict or measure. Id. at 99. See Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in
1975: An Aid in Determining, Credibility in a Perury-Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS LJ. 917
(1975) for a discussion of the validity and reliability of polygraph tests.
172. United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210
(1983). The dog was described as "the able, canny canine, Kane, with the perfect record-all
hits and no misses." Id. at 374 (Oakes, J., concurring). But see United States v. Young, 745
F.2d 733, 756 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1842 (1985), where, in 1984, the able,
canny Kane was "barking up the wrong tree" when he mistakenly alerted to drugs.
173. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 693 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983). "[I]f a dog occasionally alerts because contraband was formerly,
although no longer, present, we cannot say ... the defendant has nbt met the test." Id.
174. United States v. McCranie, 703 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992
(1983). Contents of a suitcase (cocaine) were not excluded as evidence when based on a sniff
by that dog. The dog had graduated first in his explosives sniffing class and had been reliable
in 98.9% of explosive searches. However, he had no formal drug detecting training. Id. at
1215-16. The court found that the times when the dog mistakenly alerted to explosives, drugs
were found. Id. The trial court observed that the dog had "minored in drugs and majored in
explosives." Id. at 1216.
175. See Jones v. Latexco Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 228 n.2 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
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rassment to the individual-a result Place sought to avoid. 76 Further, a
dog's mistaken alert may very well expose items to the authorities other
than the presence or absence of contraband. 77 These items may subse-
quently be used against the individual. 78
(noting that dogs respond to tobacco, lighter fluid, non-prescription drugs and odors of other
animals). See also Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), rev'4 on other
grounds, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (dog alerted to odor
on plaintiff's body of plaintiff's dog who was in heat); supra notes 127-34 and accompanying
text.
176. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. In Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), reV"d
on other grounds, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981), of the 50
students to which that dog alerted, only 17 were in possession of drugs. Yet all 50 were strip-
searched. See supra notes 128-29.
In United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918
(1976), the court noted that although a dog may be in error and fail to detect marijuana, the
mistake generally favors the suspect and precludes search and arrest. Id. Bronstein, however,
did not address the issue of a dog who alerts to substances other than drugs. In such a case the
test would not favor the suspect. The Eleventh Circuit did note this issue and questioned the
general validity of the sniff test. United States v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1491, 1492 n.1 (11th Cir.),
modified, 743 F.2d 1505 (1984). There, the bag the defendant had checked in was retrieved
and subjected to a sniff test. Although the dog reacted positively, the bags contained no drugs.
The court stated that given the result of the test in that case, the assumption in Place that dog
sniff tests are highly reliable should "give us pause." Id. But see Horton v. Goose Creek
Indep. School Dist., 693 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983),
where the court stated that the number of times a dog alerts when contraband is no longer
present, as well as the number of times he alerts to harmless substances, are merely factors to
be considered in a general determination of the dog's "reliability." A dog's incorrect alert on
several occasions would not be sufficient to render the results of the sniff test "unreliable." Id.
177. Although no drugs were found in Wheelings' apartment, other items discovered when
the police were in the apartment were admitted into evidence. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366.
178. See generally United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
66 (1985).
If a sniff is a search, the accuracy of the dog may be litigated in an attempt to suppress
evidence admitted based on the dog's alert. Even if the sniff itself is not a search, the results
are often used as a basis for probable cause prior to the issuance of a warrant. See Judge
Davis' dissent in Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1376. Judge Davis' statement that a sniff should be used
only in support of a warrant when there is other evidence strong enough to establish probable
cause misses the point. A positive alert would add to the probable cause only if the sniff was
not a search. Judge Davis' application of the probable cause requirement is thus distorted, See
Commonwealth v. White, 374 Mass. 132, 136-39, 371 N.E.2d 777, 780-82 (1977), afj'd, 439
U.S. 280 (1978) (per curiam) (use of warrant does not sanitize information gathered in viola-
tion of a constitutional right).
See United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Spetz, 721
F.2d 1457, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 111-25 for a discussion of DiCesare. In Spetz,
the defendant challenged a search under a warrant of a van pak located in a customs area of a
yard. The search was based on an earlier dog search of the van. Spetz held that misstatements
as to the past performance of the dogs were immaterial in this particular case. 721 F.2d at
1464. One dog was portrayed as being accurate 60 of 66 times (90.9%), while actually his
accuracy record was 56 of 61 occasions (91.8%). Id. The dog's ability was thus understated.
The other dog was portrayed as being two for two, while his record was actually two for six.
Id. The court concluded that these particular figures "would not have affected the magistrate's
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Evidence from dog sniff searches should not be admissible unless the
dog's training, reliability and accuracy have been demonstrated.
179 Sci-
entific devices which are invalid are discarded. 8° For example, chemical
tests are used by agents as field tests when it is important to'determine
immediately whether there is any indication of the presence or absence of
a particular drug. The cocaine field test proved to be a failure because
thetest could not distinguish cocaine from quinine,-lidocaine, procaine
,and'methapyrilene. 18' In order to eliminate most of the "false positives,"
the test was discarded and a new one developed. 182 A subjective dog
sniff, then, should not be held to any lesser standard than an objective
scientific test.
The assumption by the courts that dog sniff tests are valid and relia-
ble should "give us pause." 183 By glossing over the question of the dog's
fallibility, courts are ignoring the potential for egregious harm to individ-
uals from inaccurate and indiscriminate sniffs.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A spectrum of possible situations exists where dog sniffs might raise
fourth amendment concerns. For example, will a sniff of a hall outside a
defendant's apartment be permissible where the apartment is located in a
security building and the manager gives consent? Is a resident of a build-
ing that lacks a security system protected from random sniffing expedi-
tions by local police agencies? If high shrubs or a fence surround a
private home, can a law enforcement officer legally use a dog to sniff
judgment of the dog's reliability." Id. Implicit in the court's holding is the assumption that
where a search warrant is based upon a prior dog search, the reliability of the dog search is a
material issue and any facts significantly altering a magistrate's judgment of reliability are
material. See also Horton, 693 F.2d at 525 (remanded to district court for evaluation of dog's
reliability so that trial court could determine whether dog's alert gave rise to reasonable suspi-
cion that drugs were present).
179. For example, where in one case the performance of a dog, All, was litigated, discovery
established that Ali was accurate only 38% of the time. Brief for Appellant at 36, United
States v. Vermouth, No. 84-5111 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985), petition for cert filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3912 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1985) (No. 85-911). Ali's handler, however, represented that the dog was
infallible. The prosecution also proceeded to vouch for the "unerring accuracy and reliability
of the dog[s]." Id. "[A]n honest evaluation of the dog[s] would have precluded a magistrate
from finding probable cause to issue the warrant." Id See People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d
335, 342, 644 P.2d 810, 814, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 621 (1982) (It is proper to require "an ade-
quate demonstration of the dog's training and experience in narcotics detection before the
dog's reactions to a particular suitcase... is admitted into evidence."). See supra note 178.
180. See Frontiers of Science, 10 DRUG ENFORCEMENT, Fall 1983, at 43.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. United States v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1491, 1492 n.1 (11th Cir.), modified, 743 F.2d 1505
(1984); see supra note 177.
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inside the fence but outside the home? Will a sniff of luggage be permis-
sible while the luggage is in the hands of the owner? 84 Will a sniff of a
person ever be found constitutional?1
8 5
By focusing solely on the nature of the "information or item sought
and revealed through the use of a surveillance technique, rather than on
the context in which the information or item was concealed,"' 86 United
States v. Place '87 distorts the expectation of privacy approach adopted in
Katz v. United States1 8  and takes a dangerous step towards the reduc-
tion of fourth amendment rights. In deciding cases which involve sniffs
at locations other than airports, courts should focus, as did the United
States v. Thomas'8 9 court, on the privacy interest involved to determine
whether it is one which society will tolerate as reasonable.19 Addition-
ally, the courts should examine whether the expectation of privacy is le-
gitimate by focusing on the manner in which the individual attempted to
preserve the privacy of the item involved in the search situation. In this
latter inquiry, the nature of the item-whether contraband or not-
should have no bearing on the question of privacy.' 9'
Once a court determines that there was a reasonable and actual ex-
184. It is arguable that a sniff of objects while the objects are in possession of the owner is as
objectionable, harrowing and offensive as a body sniff. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 2.2, at
119 (Supp. 1985). It also may amount to a public accusation of a crime. Id.
185. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text. The emotionally charged issue of
people sniffing is well illustrated by a recent school board meeting in San Bernardino, Califor-
nia, where the purchase of a drug-sniffing dog was under consideration. KABC Channel 7
News, 11 p.m. broadcast (Oct. 1, 1985). While the very large german shepherd gave a demon-
stration, an irate parent yelled, "[i]f you ever let that dog loose on my kid, I'll kill him." Id.
Hardy Brown, a school board member, also voiced concern about injury which could be
caused by an excited dog. Id.
186. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1984).
Under the interpretation of the fourth amendment suggested in Place and applied in Jacobsen,
surveillance techniques, such as the sniff, would never be searches and could then be freely
pursued by police. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The limited nature of the intrusion should
not be used to determine whether the sniff is a search-as did the Place court-but rather, to
determine the appropriate standard of probable cause.
187. 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see supra notes 89-101.
188. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see supra note 41.
189. 757 F.2d 1359, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985); see supra notes 142-55 and accompa-
nying text.
190. The offensiveness of the method used should also be a factor in fourth amendment
inquiries. "The Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable
also may limit police use of unnecessarily frightening or offensive methods of surveillance and
investigation." United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975).
191. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 139 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Court has never looked to the identity of the concealed item in order to determine whether a
privacy expectation exists. Id. In Katz, the fact that the conversations were of an incriminat-
ing nature did not alter the holding. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-
52).
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pectation of privacy, the next question should be what degree or level of
"probable cause" is required for the search to be considered constitution-
ally valid under the fourth amendment. In ascertaining the appropriate
level of probable cause, the intrusiveness of the search should be bal-
anced against the legitimate government interests at stake. Some situa-
tions may permit a reduced standard of probable cause. 192 The reduced
standard finds its basis in cases such as Terry v. Ohio,193 where a "frisk"
was allowed on reasonable suspicion that .a suspect was armed and
dangerous.'
94
The suggested approach in deciding dog sniff cases is the same as the
analysis used by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Unruh.195
There, the court held that it was a search to sniff a container stolen from
an individual's home and taken to a police station. 96 The court initially
distinguished a sniff of a closed container at an airport "where an indi-
vidual's belongings might be expected to undergo inspection."' 97 How-
ever, the court noted that a sniff of a stolen container held for safekeeping
at police headquarters was a different matter.' 98 According to the Colo-
rado court, an individual in the latter situation has an expectation of
192. The Place Court should have concluded that the sniff was a search based on the ac-
knowledged reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage. Using the approach of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court could then have balanced the high governmental interest in
eliminating drug smuggling and the high number of smugglers who use airports against the
relatively minor nature of the sniff and the relative inconvenience to the owner of the luggage.
This analysis might have resulted in a finding that sniffs at airports require reasonable suspi-
cion.
In United States v. Beale (Beale II), 731 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd en banc,
Beale III, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 565 (1984), the court initially used
a reduced standard and held that a sniff of luggage at an airport was a search requiring reason-
able suspicion. See supra note 138. Although Place eventually dictated that the sniff in Beale
was not a search, Beale III, 736 F.2d at 1289, the reduced standard could be viable under a
different fact pattern. For example, the sniff of The Storage Place in United States v. Ver-
mouth, No. 84-5111 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1985) (unpublished opinion), petition for cert filed, 54
U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1985) (No. 85-966), and the sniff of the trunk in United States v.
DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985), should have been searches requiring reasonable suspi-
cion. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
193. 392 U.S. 1 (1961).
194. Id. at 30; see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. See also Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 767-70 (1966) (Searches which invade the body--e.g., extraction of blood by
needle-require greater justification than external body searches. Internal searches signifi-
cantly intrude upon dignity and privacy interests.). Exigent circumstances may also justify a
reduced standard; see supra note 79.
195. 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2349 (Colo. Jan. 21, 1986).
196. Id. at 2350.
197. Id.
198. Id. "The fact that the safe legitimately came into the hands of the police through a
series of events beyond the defendant's control or knowledge does not diminish his privacy
interests in the contents of the safe." Id.
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privacy in the item. 199
Having concluded that the sniff was a search, the Unruh court then
focused on the -degree of suspicion required.2 "° After balancing the gov-
ernment interest in curbing drug trafficking and use against the selectiv-
ity and non-intrusive nature of the sniff, the court held that reasonable
suspicion was the appropriate standard in this case.2 1'
A federal court analyzing similar facts might well conclude, under
compulsion of the Place decision, that the sniff is not a search. As the
concurrence in Unruh stated, "[1]ike the luggage in U.S. v. Place, the
locked safe was not in the defendant's home at the time of the dog sniff
but at the police station. The defendant did not demand the return of the
safe nor object to the safe being in the temporary custody of the police.
Therefore, Place applies with equal force to the facts of this case."202
The Unruh majority, however, indicated that it was neither accepting nor
rejecting Place.20 3 Unruh "leaves open the possibility that the Place sce-
nario might be found to be a 'search' under the [Colorado] constitutional
counterpart to the Fourth Amendment." 2" Nevertheless, the approach
used by the Unruh court illustrates the proper method of analysis in dog
sniff cases in both state and federal courts.
The Thomas court had no reason to consider anything less than a
probable cause standard because of the established privacy interest at-
tached to the home. However, other fact patterns will not be as clear-
cut. If the state is able to show a high interest in a minor intrusion, the
court could justify that intrusion on less than probable cause.205 If tradi-
199. Id. The court declined to accept the per se rule of Place. Id.
200. Id. The court noted that "the nature of a particular search is relevant to the question
of whether the search was reasonable." Id.
201. Id. The balance tipped in favor of the government since the governmental interest here
was "compelling." Id.
202. Id. (Rovira, J., specially concurring).
203. Id. at 2349-50.
204. Sumhary and Analysis--Warrant Unnecessary: Dog Sniff was a "Search," But Rea-
sonable Suspicion Justified It, 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 1073 (Feb. 12, 1986).
205. See supra notes 134 & 151. A reduced standard should not be confused with a sliding
scale of probable cause. A true sliding scale of probable cause could have a devastating effect
on the fourth amendment. Amsterdam, supra note 58, at 394. Permutations of possible fact
patterns are endless. To apply a sliding scale to each one would give the "cop on the beat" no
guidance. More slide than scale would result. Id. The fourth amendment would be turned
into one giant Rorschach blot. Id. at 393.
While some might fear that the reduced standard is a watering down of constitutional
guarantees, see, eg., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting), the fear
should more properly be viewed as an erosion of fourth amendment protection. United States
v. Beale (Beale II"), 736 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir.) (Pregerson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 565 (1984). Constitutional guarantees could be "defined ... out of existence." Id.
(Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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tional privacy interests are implicated, as in Thomas, then probable cause
must be retained as the fourth amendment standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States v. Thomas2" 6 decision reaffirms traditional search
and seizure principles. It uses the general Katz v. United States20 7 analy-
sis to restrict the somewhat aberrant holding in United States v. Place
20 8
by reintroducing privacy expectations into the search equation. It also
curbs the trend toward unlimited use of dogs by eliminating the indis-
criminate use of "plain view" in sniff situations. The Second Circuit im-
plicitly recognized that something detected by means of a canine sniff is
not actually in plain view, given the fact that it simply could not have
been discovered without the technique. In essence, the Thomas court
struck an appropriate balance under the facts of the case between per-
sonal privacy and the curtailment of drug trafficking. Thus, it recognized
the threat that "man's best friend" poses to peace of mind in a "man's
castle"-his home.
In continuing to safeguard fundamental privacy protections, courts
must exercise extreme caution because as the governmental interest in-
creases, the privacy interest that society is willing to tolerate, as well as
the protection of the fourth amendment, may decrease. Drugs are a ma-
jor concern to the public.20 9 The use of dogs by police, and acceptance of
their use by the public, is becoming commonplace. The trend of some
courts appears to favor the ultimate invasion-people sniffing.
Yet the use of a dog simply cannot be analogized to other technical
devices. A dog is an animal that is unable to "appreciate the finer con-
tours of the fourth amendment."21 Sniffing and biting at possessions can
easily turn into "sniffing, snuffling, or otherwise molesting people."
211
Any inquiry regarding dog sniffs must weigh the valid concerns of
the public in eradicating drugs against the dangers of too much police
discretion and the potential invasion of significant privacy interests. "It
may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing
206. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 66 (1985).
207. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see supra note 41.
208. 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
209. The drug crisis has been called "a cancer" by Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid
Hurtado. Lamar Jr., Deadly Traffic on the Border, TIME, Mar. 18, 1985, at 23, 23. See supra
notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
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